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The Politics of the Omnivores 
Elite Culture, Popular Culture, and Libertarianism 
 
Dick Houtman and Peter Achterberg 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Distinguishing the amount of capital from the composition of capital, Pierre Bourdieu (1984) 
rejects the customary one-dimensional model of social stratification in favor of a two-
dimensional one. Separate economic and cultural hierarchies are distinguished, strongly 
correlated at the lower end of the stratification order, but only relatively weakly higher up. 
Bourdieu’s distinction between economic and cultural capital has in the meantime proven to be 
useful in explaining political values. Economic progressiveness / conservatism and 
authoritarianism / libertarianism, 1 distinguished by political sociologists since at least the 
1950s (Lipset, 1959) and virtually independent of one another among the public at large,2 
prove to be radically differently related to both types of capital. 
 Economic progressiveness / conservatism stems from the strength of one’s labor market 
position (‘class’ in an economic sense or ‘economic capital’ in Bourdieu’s terms). This 
relationship can be interpreted in terms of traditional class analysis: those with a weak labor 
market position have a class interest in economic redistribution, whereas those with a strong 
labor market position, have an economic class interest in rejecting this type of economic 
redistribution. The other type of political values, authoritarianism / libertarianism, can 
however not be explained through this same class logic. It is not economically defined class 
interests that are decisive here, but rather cultural capital: having ample cultural capital at 
one’s disposal goes hand in hand with libertarian rather than authoritarian political values. 
 Lipset’s vital distinction between two types of political values thus needs to be 
supplemented by an equally significant distinction between economic capital and cultural 
capital. After all, whereas it is typically hold that a working-class position gives rise to 
economic progressiveness on the one hand and authoritarianism on the other (e.g., Lipset 1959, 
1981), this claim obscures that both types of values have quite different sources. Whereas a 
large amount of economic capital leads to economic conservatism, libertarianism stems from a 
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large amount of cultural capital (Houtman, 2001, 2003, 2004). 
 Those findings throw a new light onto the problem of why members of the middle class 
increasingly vote for leftist parties and members of the working class for rightist parties, 
effectively undermining the traditional alignment of the working class with the left and the 
middle class with the right in the process (e.g., Nieuwbeerta, 1995). This increasing ‘reverse’ 
alignment does not stem from economic voting motivations (economic progressiveness versus 
conservatism) derived from economic capital (or ‘class’ in an economic sense), but from 
cultural voting motivations (authoritarianism versus libertarianism) connected to cultural 
capital (Achterberg and Houtman, forthcoming). Due to cultural changes in late-modern 
societies cultural issues have become more politically salient, serving to increase the impact of 
cultural-capital-driven authoritarianism / libertarianism on voting behavior (Achterberg, 2004, 
forthcoming). 
 In the current paper, we interrogate the link between cultural taste and authoritarianism 
in more detail to increase theoretical understanding. For reasons to be discussed below, we 
broaden our previous perspective in two ways. First, we no longer restrict ourselves to the 
study of the political corollaries of ‘cultural capital’ (affinity with ‘highbrow’ or ‘elite’ 
culture), but compare those to those of affinity with ‘lowbrow’ or ‘popular’ culture. Second, 
we also study those of so-called ‘cultural omnivorousness’, i.e., the tendency to combine 
highbrow and lowbrow cultural taste. We first elaborate on our theoretical considerations for 
doing so in section 2. We then present our measurements and findings in sections 3 and 4, 
respectively, and finally summarize our conclusions in section 5. 
 
 
2. Elite Culture, Popular Culture, and the Rise of the Cultural Omnivore 
 
2.1. Introduction 
We feel that the measure for cultural capital that we have used in previous studies validly taps 
affinity with highbrow or elite culture, as distinguished from lowbrow or popular culture. As a 
consequence, we are also confident that our previous research convincingly demonstrates that 
what is typically referred to as ‘working-class authoritarianism’, effectively stems from a 
limited amount of cultural capital rather than from a weak labor market position. Yet, it is 
insufficiently clear how this link between cultural capital and libertarianism needs to be 
interpreted theoretically. This is largely because it is not at all clear what low scores on our 
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previous measure of cultural capital stand for. Whereas we are confident that high scores 
indicate affinity with elite culture, low scores may indicate affinity with popular culture, 
cultural inactivity/disinterest, or a mixture of both.  In an attempt to increase theoretical 
understanding, then, this paper draws on recent developments in the sociology of arts and 
culture to study the political corollaries of lowbrow or popular cultural participation alongside 
those of highbrow or elite cultural participation. 
 
2.2. Elite Culture and Popular Culture 
Bourdieu assumes that participation in elite culture excludes participation in popular culture, 
and vice versa. He thus assumes a one-dimensional cultural space, ranging from elite culture to 
popular culture, and conceives of the display of knowledge of and interest in high culture as a 
means par excellence for those with a high social status to set themselves apart from lower-
status groups: ‘The most intolerable thing for those who regard themselves as the possessors of 
legitimate [“highbrow”] culture is the sacrilegious reuniting of tastes which taste dictates shall 
be separated’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 56-7). This conceptualization of cultural stratification is 
basically similar to that in mid-twentieth century theories of mass society: ‘at the top (...) an 
educated and discerning elite with well-refined tastes and at the bottom an ignorant and 
stimulus-seeking mass’ (Peterson, 1992: 244). 
 Those at the top, or so those theories assume, can be characterized as ‘snobs’: 
 
‘The term “snob” applied to such people is of course pejorative. It is, nonetheless, a fair 
characterization of the attitude of those at the upper end of the status hierarchy because of 
their moralistic contempt for and distancing from all cultural manifestations that do not 
exactly fit with what is taken to be proper’ (Peterson, 1992: 245). 
 
 
If this image of cultural stratification is correct, it is not necessary to study the political 
implications of popular culture alongside those of elite culture. After all, if high culture gives 
rise to libertarianism, then obviously its opposite, popular culture, can only give rise to 
authoritarianism. Indeed, the idea that undiscriminating and stimulus-seeking popular masses 
are susceptible to socially conservative or even right-wing extremist political ideas and 
populist political leaders is a recurrent theme in mid-twentieth century studies of mass society. 
According to Gans (1974), however, those ideas about ‘mass culture’ derive more from 
prejudices and misconceptions among those theorists than from systematic studies of working-
class life in the USA (see also Van Zoonen 2003). 
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 To the extent that the libertarianism of the cultural elite, recorded in our previous 
research, can be interpreted in terms of the type of cultural stratification that is assumed by 
mid-twentieth century mass theorists and Bourdieu alike, we should thus be able to confirm 
two hypotheses. Higher levels of affinity with and/or participation in elite culture are then 
expected to lead to higher levels of libertarianism (hypothesis 1a), whereas higher levels of 
affinity with and/or participation in popular culture are expected to lead to lower levels of 
libertarianism (hypothesis 1b). 
 
2.3. Enter the Cultural Omnivore 
The aforementioned image of a one-dimensional cultural hierarchy, ranging from high to low, 
assumed by Boudieu’s theory of distinction and status cultures and by theories of mass society, 
has been extensively criticized by Peterson. High-status persons, Peterson has demonstrated, 
are today far from being ‘snobs’: they are rather ‘omnivorous’ in their cultural tastes (Peterson, 
1992; Peterson and Simkus, 1992; Peterson and Kern, 1996). Those findings strikingly 
contradict Bourdieu’s assumptions about cultural capital as a mode of social distinction, 
typical of high-status groups. Rather than rejecting the ‘sacrilegious reuniting of tastes which 
taste dictates shall be separated’, high-status groups freely combine highbrow and lowbrow 
genres.3 More than that: restricting oneself to a limited number of musical genres is typical of 
low-status groups to mark ‘status boundaries between taste groups defined by age, gender, 
race, region, religion, lifestyle, etc.’ (Peterson, 1992: 254; see also: Bryson, 1997: 141-156). 
Findings such as those only reinforce doubts published elsewhere (Houtman, 2003: 154-157) 
that Bourdieu’s theoretical framework needs to be bought into to satisfactorily account for the 
link between cultural capital and libertarianism. Indeed, ‘Bourdieu’s notion that a high status 
implies snobbery and, thereby, a consistent aversion to popular culture, has been inadequate 
for decades, at least outside France’ (Van Eijck, 2001: 1164). 
 Empirical studies from the United States (Peterson and Kern, 1996, Peterson and Simkus 
1992), Flanders (Belgium) (Vander Stichele and Laermans, 2004), and the Netherlands (Van 
den Broek et al., 1999; De Haan en Knulst, 2000; De Haan, 2001; Van Eijck, 2001) 
demonstrate three things. First, cultural omnivorousness is more typical of the young than of the 
elderly.  4 Second, this age difference denotes a process of social change rather than change that 
takes place during individual life cycles. So, people are not omnivorous because they are 
young, but because they have been born more recently. Third, omnivorousness is more typical 
of the highly educated than of the poorly educated (see, besides the literature cited above, also 
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Van Rees et al., 1999). The latter pattern is typically interpreted in terms of ‘high status’, but 
net of education, there are hardly differences with respect to occupational status and/or income, 
as Van Eijck (2001: 1180) rightly notes. As such, this common interpretation strongly 
resembles that in research into authoritarianism / libertarianism, in which education’s effects 
are also typically interpreted in terms of class or status, even as occupation and income play no 
role at all. 
 The findings of research into omnivorousness are, in short, very similar to those of 
research into authoritarianism / libertarianism: libertarianism, like omnivorousness, is typical 
of the young and the highly educated (Houtman, 2003). This has led Bryson (1996) to a highly 
relevant competitive test of Bourdieu’s theory of status distinction on the one hand and a theory 
of how and why a high level of education produces libertarianism on the other, focusing on the 
relationships between level of education, breadth of cultural taste, and authoritarianism / 
libertarianism. Like Peterson’s work, Bryson’s demonstrates that those with high levels of 
education (income and occupational prestige are inconsequential in her analysis, too) are not 
characterized by ‘distinction’, as Bourdieu claims, but rather by rejecting less musical genres 
than those with low levels of education. Indeed, with –0.32, the negative relationship between 
education and musical exclusiveness is stronger than any other statistical relationship in 
Bryson’s paper. Moreover, a substantial part of this relationship proves attributable to the 
libertarianism of the highly educated (Bryson, 1996). 
 To the best of our knowledge, Bryson’s is the only example of a paper that 
systematically addresses the relationship between cultural omnivorousness and 
authoritarianism / libertarianism. Her findings suggest that cultural omnivorousness and 
libertarianism are two closely related phenomena that are both typical of the highly educated. 
Unfortunately, however, her analysis does not permit conclusions about the relative 
libertarianism of ‘cultural snobs’ and ‘cultural omnivores’. This is so, because she does not 
conceptualize and measure ‘breadth in musical taste’ as combining highbrow and lowbrow 
genres, but simply as the number of the 18 used musical genres that are rejected by the 
respondent (see also Van Eijck, 2001, about this omission). This ambiguity in Bryson’s 
analysis is borne out by her finding that precisely the genres that are most popular among the 
poorly educated (i.e., gospel, country, rap, and heavy metal) are most likely to be rejected by 
those who are most ‘musically tolerant’. In short, although Bryson’s findings may well indicate 
that cultural omnivores are more libertarian than cultural snobs, her analysis does not permit 
this conclusion. Inspired by her analysis, we therefore test the hypothesis that cultural 
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omnivores, being more ‘inclusive’ in their taste than cultural snobs, are even more libertarian 
than snobs (hypothesis 2). 
 
 
3. Data and Measurement 
 
3.1. Data 
We analyze data that have been collected by Braster and Zwanenburg in 1997 among young 
people, aged 15 through 24. A mailed questionnaire produced a response rate of 36%. This is 
disappointingly low, but unfortunately quite common in the Netherlands nowadays. For more 
information about sampling and data collection, the reader is referred to Braster and 
Zwanenburg (1998).  
 Although the substantial non-response rate implies that findings need to be handled with 
care and are in need of replication, there are nevertheless three good reasons to test our 
hypotheses by means of those data. First, given the increase of cultural omnivorousness during 
the last few decades, a sample of young people is more useful than a cross-section of the 
population, because cultural omnivorousness is strongest among this age cohort. Second, this 
particular data set contains a wealth of information about cultural participation, in both its 
highbrow and lowbrow varieties, as well as political values and judgments that can be used to 
measure authoritarianism versus libertarianism. Finally, if elite and popular cultural 
participation prove unexpectedly strongly and negatively related, the high number of 
respondents (about 2,000) still guarantees a sufficiently high number of cultural omnivores to 
test our hypothesis on the political corollaries of omnivorousness. 
 
3.2. Authoritarianism / libertarianism 
Authoritarianism / libertarianism has been operationalized by means of three different 
measures. Two of those, a short version of Adorno et al.’s F-scale for authoritarianism (1950) 
and Inglehart’s (1977) index for postmaterialism, have previously been used for similar 
purposes (Houtman, 2003). Added to those two is a third scale, that taps the tendency to 
maintain a social distance vis-a-vis members of ‘non-mainstream’ or ‘deviant’ groups or 
categories such as Jehovah’s witnesses, Moroccan juveniles or gypsies. Respondents have 
been asked whether they would consider it a problem if members of each of those groups or 
categories would be their neighbors. We refer to the resulting scale as measuring ‘social 
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exclusionism’. 
 F- scale – The F-scale for authoritarianism has a reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) of 
0.69. Some typical items included in this scale are: ‘Young people sometimes have rebellious 
ideas but as they grow older they ought to grow out of them and adjust to reality’, ‘Our social 
problems would be largely solved if we could only somehow remove criminal and anti-social 
elements from society’, ‘What we need are fewer laws and agencies and more courageous, 
tireless leaders who people can have faith in’, and ‘People with bad manners, habits and 
upbringing can hardly be expected to know how to associate with decent people’. Scores have 
been assigned as factor scores to 2,041 respondents. 
 Social exclusionism – Social exclusionism has been measured by asking respondents 
whether (yes) or not (no) they would have a problem if their neighbors would be members of 
nine strategically selected groups or categories (examples are Jehovah’s witnesses, Moroccan 
juveniles, and gypsies). Table 1 demonstrates that one common dimension of social 
exclusionism underlies the nine answers (Cronbach’s a = 0.80). Scale scores have been 
computed as factor scores for 2,087 respondents. 
 
Table 1. Factor analysis of acceptance or rejection of nine groups or categories as 
neighbors (N=2,087). 
Groups or categories % chosen Loading 
 
Jehovah’s Witnesses 
Moroccan juveniles 
Gypsies 
AIDS patients 
Muslims 
Asylum seekers 
Hare Krishnas 
Homosexuals 
Surinamese juveniles 
 
33.3 
30.4 
24.0 
3.6 
18.0 
28.2 
23.3 
6.7 
17.1 
 
 
0.39 
0.78 
0.68 
0.37 
0.81 
0.75 
0.58 
0.35 
0.79 
 
 
Eigenvalue 
R2  
Cronbach’s a 
  
3.66 
0.41 
0.80 
 
 
 
Postmaterialism-index – The four political goals that are used to construct this index have 
been presented to the respondents: 1) ‘Giving the people more say in important government 
decisions’, 2) ‘Protecting free speech’, 3) ‘Maintaining order in the nation,’ and 4) ‘Fighting 
 9
 
rising prices’. According to Inglehart’s logic, the first two indicate ‘postmaterialism’ (i.e., an 
emphasis on individual liberty and self-expression) and the final two indicate ‘materialism’ 
(i.e., an emphasis on material security). Following conventional routine, respondents have been 
asked which of those four goals they personally find most important, which one comes second, 
and which one is considered least important. Answers to those three questions produce a 
ranking of all four items, making it possible to code respondents into four categories: 1) 
materialists (those who rank the two materialist goals first and second), 2) mixed materialists 
(those who rank one of the two materialist goal first and a postmaterialist one second), 3) 
mixed postmaterialists (those who rank one of the two postmaterialist goals first and a 
materialist one second), and 4) postmaterialists (those who rank the two postmaterialist goals 
first and second). A total of 2,087 respondents have valid scores for postmaterialism. 
 Authoritarianism / libertarianism – Finally, the F-scale, Inglehart’s index for 
postmaterialism, and the social exclusionism scale prove to be quite strongly related among 
themselves. A factor analysis produces a first dimension that explains 50% of the common 
variance (factor loadings: F-scale: -0.75, postmaterialism: 0.63, social exclusionism: -0.73 ). 
The three scales have been combined into a measure of authoritarianism / libertarianism by 
saving the factor scores for the 2,031 respondents with three valid scores. High scores indicate 
strong libertarianism. 
 
3.3. Elite Culture and Popular Culture 
Whereas most studies of cultural taste rely on musical preferences or dislikes (e.g., Peterson, 
1992; Peterson and Simkus, 1992; Peterson and Kern, 1996; Bryson, 1996, 1997; Van Eijck, 
2001), the data permit us to measure cultural taste more extensively. We have measured affinity 
with highbrow and lowbrow culture by means of six questions, each of which lists a number of 
activities or genres and asks respondents to indicate which of those they like or are involved 
in. Those questions refer to 1) types of books read, 2) types of cultural activities one is 
interested in, 3) television channels liked, 4) leisure-time activities one is involved in, 5) 
ingredients that are necessary for a successful holiday, and 6) musical genres one is interested 
in. Activities or genres that have been chosen by a respondent are coded 2; non-chosen 
activities or genres have been coded 1. 
All six questions have been factor analyzed separately, producing separate highbrow 
and lowbrow factors (see the appendix for details). In five cases there is one highbrow and one 
lowbrow factor. For musical taste we obtain one highbrow and two popular factors, one for 
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typically ‘white’ popular music (‘dance’) and one for typically ‘black’ popular music (‘rap’) . 
 Table 2 below contains the results of a second-order factor analysis of the thirteen 
scales that have been constructed by means of those six factor analyses. Not surprisingly after 
the foregoing, we find, once again, separate highbrow and lowbrow factors. All of the six 
highbrow factors from the separate factor analyses discussed above load on the second-order 
highbrow factor. Six of the seven lowbrow factors load on the second-order lowbrow factor. 
The single exception is ‘lowbrow reading’, which loads on neither of the two factors. 
 
 
Table 2. Factor analysis of thirteen scales for highbrow and lowbrow culture (Varimax 
rotation, N=2,087). 
Highbrow and lowbrow culture scales Factor 1 Factor 2 
 
Highbrow reading 
Highbrow cultural activities 
Highbrow television channels 
Highbrow music 
Highbrow leisure-time activities 
Highbrow holiday activities 
 
Lowbrow reading 
Lowbrow holiday activities 
Lowbrow leisure-time activities 
Lowbrow music (rap) 
Lowbrow music (dance) 
Lowbrow cultural activities 
Lowbrow television channels 
 
 
0.73 
0.53 
0.46 
0.62 
0.81 
0.64 
 
0.05 
-0.11 
-0.33 
0.19 
-0.14 
0.23 
-0.03 
 
 
0.03 
0.07 
0.20 
-0.22 
-0.21 
0.04 
 
0.18 
0.56 
0.66 
0.42 
0.40 
0.76 
0.66 
 
 
Eigenvalue 
R2 
 
2.69 
0.21 
 
2.27 
0.17 
 
 
The key finding here, of course, is that neither the six separate factor analyses, nor this second-
order one, produces a single factor with opposed loadings for highbrow and lowbrow 
preferences. This finding is not caused by our decision to use Varimax rotation. This can be 
seen from the fact that the variances explained by the first factors are typically not much higher 
than those explained by the second factors (see appendix and table 2 above). This finding 
therefore confirms Peterson’s critique of Bourdieu’s theory: there is no such thing as a one-
dimensional cultural space in which highbrow taste stands opposed to lowbrow taste. 
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 Factor scores for the second-order solution are saved as scales for affinity with elite 
culture and popular culture, respectively. Omnivorousness can then be operationalized as the 
multiplication of highbrow taste and lowbrow taste, to be included in the analysis as an 
interaction term. If omnivores are more (less) libertarian than snobs, this interaction term 
should have a positive (negative) effect on libertarianism, over and above the effects of affinity 
with elite culture and affinity with popular culture. 
 
 
3.4. Controls: age, education, and religiosity 
As explained above, omnivorousness is typical of the young and educated. Because 
libertarianism is typical of the same categories (e.g., Inglehart, 1977; Houtman, 2003), 
relationships between cultural participation and libertarianism need to be controlled for age 
and level of education. Of course, in our sample age effects are hardly to be expected, since it 
consists of young people only. Nevertheless, respondents aged 15 through 19 have been coded 
low (1) and respondents aged 20 through 24 high (2). Level of education has been measured as 
one’s current school level (if still a student) or completed level of education (if no longer a 
student), recoded into four levels: 1) Low (elementary school, VMBO, MAVO), 2) Medium 
low (MBO, HAVO), 3) Medium high (VWO), and 4) High (HBO, WO). Finally, religiosity is 
also controlled for, because it is known to be associated with lower levels of libertarianism. It 
has been measured by asking the respondent whether (2) or not (1) he or she regards himself or 
herself as belonging to a religious denomination. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Our hypotheses can now simply be tested by means of a multiple regression analysis, 
explaining the combined measure of authoritarianism / libertarianism from elite cultural 
participation, popular cultural participation, and omnivorousness, controlling for level of 
education, religiosity and age. 
 The results, reported in table 3 below, are clear enough. Hypothesis 1a is confirmed: 
Higher levels of affinity with elite culture lead to higher levels of libertarianism. This is not a 
surprising finding, of course, because our previous research has already demonstrated this 
relationship. Hypothesis 1b is rejected however: Higher levels of affinity with popular culture 
do not lead to lower levels of libertarianism. To be sure: Affinity with popular culture does not 
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lead to higher levels of libertarianism either; it is simply unrelated to authoritarianism / 
libertarianism. This is an important finding, because this second hypothesis is derived from the 
idea that the libertarianism of the cultural elite can be interpreted in terms of a cultural 
stratification with elite culture and popular culture as hierarchically ordered tastes. After all, if 
this were true, one would not only expected higher levels of libertarianism among the cultural 
elite, but also lower ones among those who participate in popular culture. The fact that this is 
not what we find, thus suggests that the relationship between cultural capital and libertarianism 
cannot be interpreted in terms of cultural stratification and status distinction. 
 
 
Table 3. Authoritarianism / libertarianism explained by highbrow and lowbrow cultural 
participation and cultural omnivorousness, controlled for age, education, and religiosity 
(regression analysis, betas, N=1,934). 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Lowbrow cultural participation 
Highbrow cultural participation 
Omnivorousness (interaction term: lowbrow x highbrow) 
Low level of education 
Medium-low level of education 
Medium-high level of education 
High level of education (= reference category) 
Religious (1=no/2=yes) 
Age (15-19=1/20-24=2) 
 
0.01  
0.27*** 
-0.03 
 
0.00  
0.23*** 
-0.02 
-0.29*** 
-0.14** 
-0.07 
ref. cat. 
-0.06** 
-0.06* 
 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.07 
 
0.10 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 is also rejected. Cultural omnivores, who are more ‘inclusive’ in their taste than 
cultural snobs, are nevertheless not more libertarian than the latter. This is an equally important 
finding, because it demonstrates that libertarianism cannot be attributed to a tendency to 
combine a wide range of radically different cultural genres and activities, as Bryson’s analysis 
suggests. After all, those who combine high levels of affinity with highbrow culture with high 
levels of affinity with lowbrow culture are not more libertarian than those who can be 
characterized as ‘cultural snobs’. It is, in short, only affinity with highbrow culture that is 
related to libertarianism. 
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5. Conclusion and debate 
 
In this paper we have attempted to advance our theoretical understanding of the link between 
cultural capital (affinity with and participation in highbrow or elite culture) and libertarianism. 
Our findings reveal, first, that this cannot be attributed to the elite status of highbrow culture. If 
it could, we would after all expect affinity with and participation in low-status popular culture 
to have a reverse effect on libertarianism, i.e., decreasing rather than increasing it. But this is 
not what we find. Affinity with lowbrow culture is simply unrelated to authoritarianism / 
libertarianism. Our second conclusion is that the so-called ‘cultural omnivorousness’ of those 
with a high level of cultural capital, contrary to what Bryson’s analysis suggests, also fails to 
account for their libertarianism. After all, cultural omnivores are not more libertarian than 
cultural snobs. 
 We can only conclude, then, that a Weberian ‘elective affinity’ exists between, on the 
one hand, highbrow culture, and on the other, a tendency to accept a wide range of different 
lifestyles as legitimate. The latter tendency boils down to emphasizing the liberty of 
individuals to be(have) as they wish and, consequently, to rejecting belief in a ‘meta-social’ 
foundation that would allow one to hierarchically order those different lifestyles in terms of 
more or less ‘deviant’ or ‘morally reprehensible’. This tendency, in brief, constitutes a sort of 
‘moral relativism’, which has gradually replaced ‘absolute truths, revealed by God’ (Inglehart, 
1997: 88). This sort of moral relativism has become increasingly widespread as a consequence 
of a process of ‘postmodernization’ (Inglehart, 1997), ‘detraditionalization’ (Heelas, 1995) or 
‘reflexive modernization’ (Beck et al. 1994). But why would affinity with highbrow culture be 
so strongly related with this libertarian moral relativism? 
 In traditional societies, art is intimately bound up with other societal domains such as 
religion, politics and the economy. It is used for decorating places of religious worship 
(shrines, temples, churches, etcetera) and religious ceremonial utensils (holy scriptures, 
ceremonial dresses and paraphernalia, etcetera), as well as for decorating equipment that is 
used in agriculture, crafts, hunting, and warfare (tools, weapons, means of transport, etcetera) 
(Wilson, 1982). Under conditions of (late-)modernity, however, art has become increasingly 
separated from those other institutional domains. As a consequence, it has become thrown back 
upon itself and has as such become subject to its own institutional logic (Bell, 1976). Dutch 
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sociologist of art and culture Bevers (1985: 58) characterizes this logic of the modern art 
world in terms of a ‘routinization’ or ‘institutionalization’ of ‘a state of permanent reflection’: 
 
‘Reflection, begun when art was experiencing a revolutionary development [the rise of 
modern abstract art, DH/PA], has since lost its instrumental function and has become a 
goal in itself. Modern art is no longer problematical, but the framing of the problem has 
become part of art itself: art has become reflexive art. (...) More than religion and 
science, reflexive art is focused on itself and more sensitive to subjectivist tendencies in 
culture’ (Our translation from Dutch, DH/PA). 
 
It seems not too far-fetched to assume that it is precisely this state of permanent reflection in 
modern art that erodes not only the customary boundaries of ‘real’ art, but also seriously 
erodes the possibility to believe in any ‘objective’ or ‘pre-given’ meaning in a more general 
sense. It is perhaps hardly surprising, then, that in late modernity affinity with highbrow culture 
goes hand in hand with a libertarian moral relativism. It is, after all, precisely this type of 
solidly founded meaning that is rejected by those who stand out as libertarians. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1. Economic progressiveness and economic conservatism refer to the extent to which people are for or 
against the state imposing restrictions on the inequality generated by a free market. Authoritarianism / 
libertarianism entails the extent to which people believe deviations from traditional values and norms 
are acceptable. As regards economic conservatism / progressiveness, people who are in favor of 
economic redistribution by the state are defined as progressive and people who prefer a distribution 
based on the free market are defined as conservative. As regards the dichotomy between 
authoritarianism and libertarianism, people who feel individuals should be free to live their lives as they 
wish are defined as libertarian and people who believe deviations from traditional values and norms are 
unacceptable are defined as authoritarian. 
 
2. Hence, knowing people’s ideas about the desirability of a more equal income distribution (economic 
progressiveness / conservatism) does not make it possible to predict how authoritarian or libertarian. See 
the references to the relevant literature in Houtman (2003, chapter 1) as well as his own findings (ibid.: 
chapter 4). 
 
3. It is not clear whether those findings indicate that in the past a one-dimensional image of cultural 
stratification did make sense in most western countries or that such an image is a particular characteristic 
of French society. See Calhoun (1993) about the latter possibility and Lamont (1992) for evidence that 
it is more typical of France than of the United States. We won’t go into this question further here. 
 
4. For an exception to this general rule, see Van Rees et al. (1999), where the omnivores prove 
somewhat older than the other categories. We do not consider this an important anomalous finding for 
three reasons, however. First, the four latent classes (constructed by means of a latent cluster analysis of 
reading in leasure time) raise a number of questions, especially the circumstance that the omnivorous 
class is disturbingly small (4%) and the non-reading class (neither highbrow nor lowbrow) disturbingly 
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large (67%), leaving a cluster of ‘lowbrow readers’ (13%) and a cluster of ‘highbrow readers’ (15%). 
Second, the age effect seems quite small (see table 3 on p. 359). Third, this paper offers a merely 
statistical excercise without a serious attempt to test theoretically derived hypotheses and/or theoretically 
interpret the findings (especially this anomalous age effect, of course). 
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Appendix 
 
Table 4. Factor analysis of reading ten types of books (N=2,087). 
Type of literature read Factor 1 Factor 2 
 
Books about history 
Books about cultures 
Dutch literature 
Foreign literature 
Poetry 
 
Books on art 
Spy novels 
Detectives 
Adventure novels 
Science fiction 
 
 
0.61 
0.61 
0.61 
0.62 
0.57 
0.61 
 
0.02 
-0.03 
0.03 
0.08 
 
 
0.06 
-0.03 
0.17 
0.23 
-0.05 
-0.09 
 
0.75 
0.76 
0.71 
0.46 
 
Eigenvalue 
R2 
 
2.21 
0.23 
 
1.94 
0.19 
 
 
 
Table 5. Factor analysis of visiting thirteen types of performances (N=2,087). 
Type of performance visited Factor 1 Factor 2 
  
Classical music concert 
Opera 
Operetta 
Jazz 
Ballet 
Museum with old masters 
Museum for modern art 
 
Discotheque 
Musical 
Comedy 
Cabaret 
Modern dance 
Pop concert 
 
 0.68 
 0.57 
 0.44 
 0.43 
 0.48 
 0.68 
 0.57 
 
 -0.28 
 0.17 
 0.10 
 0.24 
 0.21 
 -0.06 
 
 -0.21 
 0.03 
 0.07 
 0.19 
 0.27 
 0.08 
 0.18 
 
 0.45 
 0.57 
 0.49 
 0.47 
 0.52 
 0.60 
 
 
Eigenvalue 
R2 
 
 2.41 
 0.19 
 
 1.82 
 0.14 
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Table 6. Factor analysis of watching nine television channels (N=2,087). 
Television station watched Factor 1 Factor 2 
 
Discovery 
CNN 
Euronet 
BBC 
VPRO  
 
Veronica 
RTL4 
RTL5 
SBS6 
TMF 
 
 
 0.02 
 0.09 
 0.10 
 -0.06 
 -0.27 
 
 0.74 
 0.68 
 0.58 
 0.78 
 0.59 
 
 
 0.59 
 0.64 
 0.40 
 0.62 
 0.47 
 
 -0.04 
 -0.20 
 0.13 
 0.05 
 0.05 
 
Eigenvalue 
R2 
 
 2.39 
 0.24 
 
 1.58 
 0.16 
 
 
Table 7. Factor analysis of eleven types of leisure activities (N=2,087). 
Leisure activities Factor 1 Factor 2 
 
Acting 
Writing or writing poetry 
Listening to music at home 
Visiting music festivals 
Making music oneself 
Making music with others 
 
Watching televison 
Visiting a cinema 
Shopping 
Visiting a discotheque 
Visiting a bar 
 
0.34 
0.42 
0.32 
0.52 
0.71 
0.70 
 
-0.18 
0.12 
0.04 
0.03 
0.14 
 
0.15 
0.00 
0.15 
0.23 
-0.29 
-0.27 
 
0.44 
0.53 
0.46 
0.64 
0.59 
 
 
Eigenvalue 
R2 
 
1.73 
0.16 
 
1.70 
0.15 
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Table 8. Factor analysis of seven types of holiday activities (N=2,087). 
Preferred holiday activities Factor 1 Factor 2 
 
Culture 
Museums 
Nature 
 
Beach 
Sun 
Sea 
Romance 
 
-0.13 
-0.11 
-0.17 
 
0.89 
0.73 
0.87 
0.42 
 
0.78 
0.70 
0.63 
 
0.05 
0.03 
0.12 
0.28 
 
 
Eigenvalue 
R2 
 
2.30 
0.33 
 
1.60 
0.23 
 
 
Table 9. Factor analysis of liking nine musical genres (N=2,087). 
Musical genre Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
 
Opera 
Classical music 
Baroque 
  
House 
Rave 
Dance 
 
Rap 
Hip hop 
Soul 
 
0.03 
-0.03 
-0.02 
 
0.01 
0.05 
0.06 
 
0.85 
0.86 
0.56 
 
0.03 
-0.14 
-0.02 
 
0.82 
0.75 
0.63 
 
0.12 
0.06 
-0.03 
 
0.65 
0.72 
0.77 
 
-0.04 
-0.02 
-0.05 
 
-0.05 
-0.06 
0.06 
 
 
Eigenvalue 
R2 
 
1.77 
0.20 
 
1.67 
0.19 
 
1.55 
0.17 
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